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Code are compatible.3 The majority of courts have found these sections are not compatible, and a
trustees ability to sell property “free and clear” of third party interests is subject to the rights of
the non-debtor lessee to stay.4 A minority of courts have found these sections are compatible,
and have held that a trustee can sell property free and clear of a leasehold interest.5
This article explores these conflicting opinions. Part I discusses the seminal case
deciding a trustee’s ability to sell property “free and clear” of third party interests is subject to
the rights of the non-debtor lessee to stay. Part II discusses the decisive cases deciding Section
363(f) rights to sell property “free and clear” of third party interests supersedes a lessee Section
365(h) rights to stay.
I.

Majority View: A trustees ability to sell property “free and clear” of third party
interests is subject to the rights of the non-debtor lessee to stay.
A majority of courts have found a trustees ability to sell property “free and clear” of third

party interests is subject to the rights of the non-debtor lessee’s 365(h) right to stay. The South
Carolina bankruptcy court, in In Re Taylor,6 was the first court to record a decision reaching this
conclusion.7 Henry Thomas Taylor (“Taylor”) was the owner of four nursing home properties

Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding “the terms of section
365(h) do not supersede those of section 363(f)”).
4

See In re Revel AC, Inc., 532 B.R. at 220.
See Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
6
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996).
7
See Id. Two other cases had previously addressed how 365(h) deals with rejected executor
contracts. See In re LHD Realty Corp., 20 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D.Ind. 1982) (“It is the court's
view that Congress' intent in enacting [§ 365] was to make that section the exclusive remedy
available to a debtor in an executory lease situation. In the name of equity, the court cannot
disregard the plain language of § 365 and the mandate of Congress embodied therein.”); see also
In re Robinson Truck Line, Inc., 47 B.R. 631 (Bankr. N.D.Miss.1985) (If Section 365 “is the
exclusive remedy for debtors faced with an unexpired lease within Chapter 11 proceedings, then
it necessarily follows that it should also govern executory contracts within the context of a
Chapter 11 plan.”).
5
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and was the sole stockholder in a company that owned a fifth nursing home.8 On April 1 1993,
Taylor leased all five of the properties to Magnolia Entities (“Magnolia”), a management
company, for $110,850 per month plus taxes. Thereafter, Magnolia Entities disputed the amount
Taylor claimed was due for taxes. On August 3, 1994 Taylor filed a petition for relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In January of 1996, Taylor requested an order approving the
sale of all five properties “free and clear” of Magnolia’s leases to Delta Health Group. Magnolia
objected to the proposed sale, arguing that notwithstanding the sale, they should be permitted to
retain possession of the property under Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. 9
The Taylor court held that the debtor’s ability to sell the property “free and clear” was
subject to Magnolia’s 365(h) rights to stay. First, applying the principle of generalia specialibus
non derogant (the specific governs the general), the court reasoned that because 365(h) was
specifically tailored to deal with the rights of debtor lessors and lessees, 365(h) should be the
sole provision to govern the relationship between them.10 Second, it would make no sense that
the debtor could do under 363(f), what he specifically could not do under 365(h).11 Third, the
legislative history of section 365(h) indicated that it was meant to protect the lessee’s rights and
prevent the modifications or changing of the lessees’ leasehold estate during bankruptcy
proceedings. A 1978 Senate report remarked that under the terms of section 365(h), “the tenant
will not be deprived of his estate for the term for which he bargained.”12 The section-by-section
analysis of the 1994 Amendments to the Code13 states “section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code
… mandate(s) that lessees cannot have their rights stripped away if a debtor rejects its obligation
8

In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 164 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996).
Id. at 144-46
10
In re Taylor, 198 B.R. at 164.
11
Id. at 165.
12
Id.
13
Id.
9
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as a lessor in bankruptcy”14 and that section 365(h) “will enable the lessee to retain its rights that
appurtenant to its leasehold.”15 These three reasons would be cited by every other court that has
held that a trustees ability to sell property “free and clear” of third party interests is subject to the
rights of the non-debtor lessee to stay.16
Although referred to as a majority,17 only five courts have directly addressed this issue
and adopted the view that trustees ability to sell property “free and clear” of third party interests
is subject to the rights of the non-debtor lessee to stay.18 The South Carolina bankruptcy court,19
New Jersey bankruptcy court,20 Massachusetts bankruptcy court,21 the bankruptcy court for the
Eastern District of Virginia,22 and the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Kentucky23
have all ruled this way. Indeed, the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Kentucky has
ruled the lessees’ rights to stay via Section 365(h) trump the debtor/tenants rights to sell the
property free and clear of all interests.24
II.

Minority” view: Section 363(f) rights to sell property “free and clear” of third party
interests supersedes a lessee Section 365(h) rights to stay.

14

Id.
Id.
16
See In re Churchill Properties III, Ltd., 197 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), In Re
Haskel, L.P., 321 B.R. 1, 7, 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005), In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R.
154, 158 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012); In re Revel AC, Inc., 532 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).
17
See Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
18
The Northern district in Illinois had also adopted this view in In Re Churchill but that case
should be considered abrogated via Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d
537 (7th Cir. 2003). See In re Churchill Properties III, Ltd., 197 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996).
19
In re Taylor 198 B.R. 142, 164 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996).
20
In re Revel AC, Inc., 532 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).
21
In re Haskell L.P., 321 B.R. 1, 9 (Bankr. D.Mass. 2005).
22
In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. 154, 158 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 2012).
23
In re Samaritan Alliance, LLC, No. 07–50735, 2007 WL 4162918 (Bankr. E.D.Ky. Nov. 21,
2007).
24
Id.
15
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A number of courts, including the highest court to have addressed the conflict, have
found Section 363(f) rights to sell property “free and clear” of third party interests supersedes a
lessee Section 365(h) rights to stay.25
1. The Seventh Circuit held there is no conflict between section 363(f) and section
365(h).
In Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel, the 7th Circuit found that there is no conflict
between Sections 363(f) and 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. Qualitech Steel Corporation
(“Qualitech”) owned and operated a steel mill.26 Before petitioning the court for relief of its
debts under Chapter 11, Qualitech entered into two contracts with Precision Industries
(“Precision”).27 The first contract was a supply agreement, that provided Precision would
construct a supply warehouse on Qualitechs property and operate it for a ten-year period. The
second contract was a land lease agreement, which granted Precision exclusive possession of the
underlying property for a period of ten years in exchange for $1.28 According to the land lease
agreement, Precision had the right to remove all improvements from the property if the lease was
terminated early. Precision then built and operated the warehouse in accordance with the first
contract. Qualitech filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition three months later. Upon Qualitech’s
request, the bankruptcy court issued an order approving a sale of all of Qualitech’s assets “free
and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and interests” under section 363(f).29 Precision was

25

See In re Downtown Athletic Club of New York City, Inc., No. M-47 (JSM), 2000 WL
744126, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000); In re R.J. Dooley Realty, Inc., 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1761,
2010 WL 2076959 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2010); In re Hill, 307 B.R. 821, 825 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 2004).
26
Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 540, 541 (7th Cir. 2003).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 544
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given notice of the sale but did not object.30 The sale order specifically provided that the
purchaser retained the debtor’s rights to assume and assign executory contracts and leases under
Section 365(h).31 After a period of prolonged contract negotiation with the new owners,
Precision was locked out of the leased property.32 In response to the lock out, Precision sued the
new owners arguing that they had the right to stay on the property along with all appurtenant
rights for the remainder of the lease term under 365(h). The bankruptcy court held that the sale
was “free and clear” of Precisions leasehold interests. The case was appealed to the district court,
which reversed. The case was then appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which held the terms
of section 365(h) do not supersede those of section 363(f) and simply apply in different
scenarios.33
The Seventh Circuit provided four reasons for its holding. First, in examining the
language of section 363(f), the court found that the words “any interest” were broad enough to
encompass those of a lessee.34 Second, Sections 363 and 365 “contain cross-references indicating
that certain provisions are subject to other statutory mandates.”35 Since sections 363(f) and
365(h) lack similar cross-references, courts should not read Section 363(f) as subordinate to
Section 365(h). Third, the court found that the language of section 365(h) plainly only applies
when “the trustee [or debtor-in-possession] rejects an unexpired lease of real property.”36 If a
debtor “cancels” the lease via a section 363(f) sale, a lessee cannot invoke their section 365(h)

30

Id.
Id. at 546
32
Id.
33
Id. at 547
34
Id.
35
Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 547.
36
Id.
31
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rights because the scope of section 365(h) is limited to rejection by the debtor.37 The court’s final
point was that the statute does provide the lessee with protection.38 Section 363(e) allows a lessee
to petition bankruptcy courts to “prohibit or condition such ... sale ... as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of such interest.”39 The reasoning the Qualitech court used in coming to this
conclusion has been used by almost every other court that has held 363(f) sales supersede a
lessees rights under 365(h) to stay on the leased property. 40
By concluding that 363(f) and 365(h) apply to separate scenarios, the Qualitech court
arguably sidestepped the question of what actually happens if a lease is actually rejected under
365(h) and a 363(f) sale occurs.41 The court in Dishi & Sons vs. Bay Condos LLC, addressed
that issue head on.
2. Dishi v. Bay Condos: Different reasoning but same result.
While coming to the same conclusion as Qualitech, the Bay Condos court used different
reasoning. In Bay Condos, the debtor filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 relief.42 As part of
the reorganization plan, debtor Bay Condos sought to sell two of its commercial condominiums
“free and clear” of third party right under 363(f).43 The reorganization plan provided that all
leases were rejected. As part of the reorganization plan, the bankruptcy court issued an order
approving the bidding and sale procedures, and an auction was held for the condominiums.

37

Id. (“Nothing in the express terms of section 365(h) suggests that it applies to any and all
events that threaten the lessees possessory rights.”).
38
Id.
39
Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 548.
40
See In re Downtown Athletic Club of New York City, Inc. (Cheslock-Bakker & Assocs., Inc.),
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7917, 2000 WL 744126, *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000); In re R.J. Dooley
Realty, Inc., 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1761, 2010 WL 2076959, *6-8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 21,
2010).
41
Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
42
Id.
43
Id.
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Dishi was the successful bidder of a property at the auction. Before the sale order was entered, a
lessee of the property, The Ginger Man (“TGM”), submitted a letter to the court “asserting its
right to retain possession of the unit under Section 365(h).” A hearing was held and the
bankruptcy court issued the Sale Approval Order, which approved the Sale to Dishi and held that
TGM had a right to remain in possession of the property for the duration of the lease under
365(h). Dishi then appealed to the district court.
In determining whether the debtors ability to sell property “free and clear” of third party
interests is subject to the rights of the non-debtor lessee to stay once the lease is rejected, the
district court examined the purpose of section 365(h) in isolation and found that the primary
function of section 365(h) is to prevent the lessors’ “obligations under the lease” from
“outweighing the benefits to the estate”.44 The only right 365(h) provides to the lessee is to
maintain the rights that are appurtenant to the leasehold in the event a debtor exercises his
rejection powers.45 In other words, 365(h) was not intended to provide debtor’s lessee with rights
that they would “not enjoy outside of bankruptcy.”46 The Bay Condos court found this reading
persuasive since Section 365(h) does not prevent a trustee from “avoid[ing] interests as a bona
fide purchaser, or to avoid interest that was fraudulently transferred by the debtor.”47 The court
found this reading of sections 365(h) and section 363(f) prevents an inapposite reading of the
Bankruptcy Code and allows both sections to function harmoniously with one another despite the
contradictory language in both sections.48

44

Id. at 705.
Id.
46
Id. at 707.
47
Id.
48
Id.
45
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While the Bay Condos Court went to some length to try to differentiate itself from
Qualitech,49 the results reached are the same. The only real difference is that the Bay Condos
decision clarifies that even when a contract is rejected under 365(a), a property can be sold “free
and clear” of third party interests if the Section 363(f) elements are found.
There have been four courts that have directly held that sales “free and clear” of third
party interests can occur when a tenant claims his rights to stay under 365(h). The seventh circuit
follows this view50 as does the Southern District of New York51 and the bankruptcy court in the
Western District of Pennsylvania.52
Conclusion
Courts are split on if Section 363(f) and 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code are in conflict
with each other. The majority view is that a trustees ability to sell property “free and clear” of
third party interests is subject to the rights of the non-debtor lessee to stay. The minority view is
that Section 363(f) rights to sell property “free and clear” of third party interests supersedes a
lessee Section 365(h) rights to stay. The argument for both views is based largely on statutory
interpretation. Until a higher court or Congress addresses the relationship between section
365(h) and 363(f), the debtor lessor and the lessee’s rights will largely be determined by
geographic location.
49

Id. at 699 (“This Court reaches the same result, but declines to endorse the majority
interpretation. Although § 365(h) is applicable to § 363(f) sales, it does not give the lessee
absolute rights that take precedence over the trustee's right to sell free and clear of interests.
Rather, it clarifies that the lessee may retain its appurtenant rights … Section 363(f), in turn,
authorizes the trustee to extinguish the lessee's appurtenant rights—like any other interest in
property—but only if one of five conditions is satisfied”)
50
See Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003).
51
See In re Downtown Athletic Club of New York City, Inc., No. M-47 (JSM), 2000 WL
744126, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000); In re R.J. Dooley Realty, Inc., 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1761,
2010 WL 2076959 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2010);
Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
52
In re Hill, 307 B.R. 821, 825 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004).
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